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Abstract: 
We construct the belief function that quantifies 
the agent' beliefs about which event of Q will 
occurred when he knows that the event is 
selected by a chance set-up and that the 
probability function associated to the chance set 
up is only partially known. 
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1. INTRODUCTION. 
1) The use of belief functions to quantify degrees of 
belief is muddled by problems that resul t  from the 
confusion between belief and lower probabilities (or 
between plausibility and upper probabilities). Beliefs can 
be induced by many types of information. In this paper, 
we consider only one very special case: beliefs induced 
on a frame of discernment Q when the clements of Q will 
be selected by a random process. It seems reasonable to 
defend the idea that the belief of an event should be 
numerically equal to the probability of that event. This 
principle is called the Hacking Frequency Principle 
(Hacking 1965). 
But there are cases where the probability function that 
governs the random process is not exaclly known. This 
lack of knowledge can be encountered when probabil itics 
are partially defined or when data are missing. As an 
example, suppose an urn where there arc 100 balls. Its 
composition is not exactly known. All that is known is 
that there are between 30 and 40 black balls, between 10 
and 50 white balls, and the other are red. What is your 
belief that the next randomly selected ball will be black? 
Suppose you have selected 50 balls at random with 
replacement and you have observed 15 black balls, 20 
white, 10 reds and 5 'not black'. What is your belief now 
that there are between 35 and 37 black balls? What is 
your belief now that the next randomly selected ball will 
be black? These are the problems we solve in this paper. 
In this paper, we accept that beliefs are quantified by 
belief functions, as described in the transferable belief 
model (Smets 1990b, Smets and Kennes 1994). The 
transferable belief model is a model for quantified beliefs 
developed independently of any underlying probabilistic 
model. It is neither Dempster's model nor iL<; today 
versions (Shafer, 1990, Kohlas, 1994). It is not a model 
based on inner measures (Halpern and Fagin, 1990). 
What we study here is just a special case of belief 
function. We study the belief induced by the knowledge 
of the existence of an objective chance set up that 
generates random events according to a probability 
function, probability function that happens to be only 
partially known to us. 
2) Suppose a frame of discernmen t .Q, i.e., a set of 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive events such as one and 
only one of them is true (we accept the close world 
assumption (Smets 1988)). Suppose the true element will 
be selected by a chance process. Let P:2n�[O,l] be the 
probability function over n where P(A) for A<;;;Q 
quantifies the probability (chance) that the selected 
clement is in A. We accept that this probability measure 
is "objective". The problem is to assess Your degree of 
belief. You denotes the agent who hold the beliefs. Your 
beliefs arc quantified by a belief function bel:2n--7[0,1], 
about the fact that the selected element is in A, given You 
only have some partial knowledge about the value of P. 
Should You know P, then by Hacking Frequency 
Principle (1965) Your degree of belief bei(A) for each 
A<;;; Q should be equal to P(A): 
If You know that P(A) = PA VA C:Q 
then bel(A) = PA VA C:Q 
In that case bel is a probability function over Q. But 
remember that bel and P do not have the same meaning; 
they only share the same values. P quantifies the 
probability (chance) of the events in Q, bel quantifies the 
belief over Q induced in You by the knowledge of the 
value of the probabilities. P exists independently of me; 
bel cannot exist if You do not exist. 
Let lP n be the set of probability functions over Q. 
Suppose that You know only that the probability function 
p that governs the random process over n is an element 
of a subset.:?-' of lP n· The problem is to determine Your 
belief about Q given You know only that Pis an element 
of.:?-'(but You do not know which one). 
In many cases,!?' is uniquely defined by its upper and 
lower probabilities functions P* and P* where: 
P*(A) = min { P(A) : PE� 
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P*(A) =max { P(A) : Pe.'?-j = 1 - P*(A) 
or.91= (P: Pe!P0, P*(A) 5 P(A) 5 P*(A), VA<;;;Q}. 
Just as P and bel characterize d ifferent concepts, P* and 
bel characterize also different concepts, even when P* is 
mathematically a belief function. The function bel 
concerns Your belief over Q. The function P* gives the 
lowest possible values for the probability of the events in 
0. compatible with what You know. 
This knowledge that Pe� IPn is translated into a belief 
beliPn over IP0.1 That belief only supports .9, i.e . , its 
basic belief masses are: 
miP0(� = 1 if Cl-_fJ'J 
= 0 otherwise 
Given Your belief over IP0, can You build Your belief 
over Q, In this paper, we will show how to build such a 
belief function. 
Classical material about belief functions and the 
transferable belief model can be found in Shafer (1976), 
Smets (1988) and Smets and Kennes (1994). 
2. IMPACT OF HACKING FREQUENCY 
PRINCIPLE. 
The general frame consists of : 
- 0.: the finite set of possible elementary events Wj, i::: 1, 
2 .. . n, (the outcomes of the stochastic experiment); 
- IP n: the set of probability functions P over 0.; 
- IBIP0: the set of belief functions over IP0. 
Let N = [1, 2 ... n]. Let W = IPn x Q_ All subsets A of W 
can be represented as the finite union of the intersection 
of A with each of the elementary events Wi: 
VA�W. A= u (Ai, wJ (2.1) 
iEN 
where Ai = proj(Ancyl(wi)Y:IPn. cyl(X) is the cylin­
drical extension of X on W where X denotes a subset of 
Q (or IP n). and proj(B) is the projection of Be;; W on Q 
(or IP n) (context makes it clear which domain and which 
range are involved). 
The major problem solved in this paper is the 
construction of the belief function belw on W that would 
result if You were in a state of total ignorance about the 
value of P. If You have some prior belief bciiPn about the 
value of P, the belief belw over W would be combined 
with the vacuous extension of beliP 0 on W by the 
application of Dempster's rule of combinati on . We will 
treat essentially the case where You only know that PE.:P 
where.9Z'is a subset of 1Pn. i.e., when.9'is the only focal 
1 subscripts of m and bel denote their domain. 
element and Your belief over lP n can be represented by 
the basic belief ass i gnment with miPn� = 1. 
General ization for a finite (or countable) numbers of 
focal elements is immediate. Further generalization is 
more delicate. 
Let IBw be the set of belief functions over W. What is 
their nature? We are going to construct the equivalent of 
the basic belief masses (bbm) on IBw. We say equivalent 
as W is not a finite space and the concept of basic belief 
masses has to be extended in order to cope with the 
structure of W. The bbm will become some sort of 
'densities'. For simplicity sake, they are also denoted by 
mw : 2W�(O,I]. The value belw(A) is defined as the 
'integral' of the mw values given to the non empty 
subsets of A. It happens that in the case considered in this 
paper, mw is a real density for which classical integrals 
are well defined. We call the mw function a basic belief 
density (bbd) to enhance its particular nature. Those 
subsets A of W such that mw(A)>O are called the focal 
elements of mw. 
The first constraint about mw results from Hacking 
Frequency Principle. Suppose You know the values P(Wi) 
of the object ive probability function P on Q for every 
WjE Q (what is translated by .9 = {P}). Let beln{Pl 
denotes Your belief over 0. when You know that .9 = 
{P].2 By Hacking Frequency Prin ciple , the value 
bcln ( P) (X) for any subset X of Q is numerically equal to 
the probability P(X) given to X. 
By construction, beln {P) results from the marginalizing 
ofbclw{PJ over 0.: 
bci0fPJ(X) = belw{Pl(cyi(X)) vxcn 
Hacking Freque ncy P rinc iple implies the nex t 
requirement. 
Requirement 1: 
If You know thatf?!= (P} 
then beJwfPl(cyi(X)) = P(X) 'v'XCQ (2.2) 
Let n(P) = cyl( {P)) <;;;; W, then n(P) =: u ( {P(�)}, Uli) by 
tEN 
2.1. Thus belw { P l(cyl(X)) = belw(cyl(X)I1t(P)). The 
second term is just the result of the conditioning of belw 
on cyl( {P} ) , what is achieved by the application of 
Dempster's rule of conditioning. Hence the bbd mw(A), 
A .;;;w is transferred to Ann:(P). Let A= u (Ai, w{)CW, 
ieN 
then m(A) is transferred to Ann(P) = u (Ain {P(Uli)), 
iEN 
Wj). 
2Superscripts of bem and m denote Your knowledge 
about P, i.e., the focal element of be!IPn· 
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The result of this conditioning on rt(P) is a probability 
function. Hence belw {P} must be a Bayesian belief 
function, i.e., only singletons can be focal elements and 
beiwiPl(W) = 1. The singletons of W have the form 
({P(Wi)J, Wi) for ie {1, ... n}, Pe 1Pn,. Hence mw must 
satisfy: 
mw( u
N
(Ai , wJ) = 0 if Ai nAj ,t0 for some i;t:je N 
IE 
= 0 if u Ai ;t: IP n ieN 
� 0 otherwise. (2.3) 
The impact of Hacking Frequency Principle, translated by 
2.3, is very strong. It implies that the focal elements of 
mw can be represented as u (Aj, Wj) where the Aj, 
ieN 
i=l , ... n, are non empty elements of a partition of IP n· 
3. THE CASE WHERE IQI = 2. 
We study now the case where IQI = 2. Let n = {S, F) 
where S and F denote Success and Failure, respectively. 
0 
s 
F 
0 a 
Figure 1: Structure of the domain of mw and one 
example of bbd centered on a when 101 = 2. 
Let A r:;;, W be a focal element of mw, then A = (a, 
S)u( a, F) where a.qo, 1] and a is the complement of 
a. relative to [0, 1]. For simplicity sake, the bbd mw((a, 
S)u( a, F)) is written as mw(a.). 
W can be graphically represented by two [0, 1] intervals 
where the upper [0, 1] interval is the intersect ion of W 
with S, and the lower one is the intersection of W with F 
(see figure 1). Every focal element of mw is made of a 
set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive intervals that are 
either in the S domain or the F domain. By convention , 
intervals are defined as closed to the left and open to the 
right, except when 1 is the right limit, in which case the 
interval is also closed to the right . 
We introduce an extra assumption. 
Requirement 2: 
If IQI=2, belJP0([a,b)u[c,d) IS)= belJP0([a,d) IS) 
for every o��b�c�d� 1. 
It is equivalent to assuming that mw(a) is null except if a 
= (a, 1]. The origin of the assumption is to be found in the 
meaning of the bbd. The bbd mw(a) for � [0, 1] is that 
part of belief (a density here) that supports the fact that 
P(S)e a (and P(F)e a). Suppose we condition mw on S. 
Each bbd mw( a) is transferred to (a, S)r;;,w. 
Requirement 2 means that if after conditioning on S a bbd 
supports P(S) = x e [0,1], it also supports every value in 
[0, 1] larger than x. Observing a success could support 
P(S) = .3, but that support should then also be given to 
P(S) = .4 etc .... 
This assumption means that each focal element is a step 
function that starts from ({0). F), jumps from the F 
domain to the S domain at some a in [0,1], and ends at 
( { 1 J, S) (see figure 1). 
Finally, if we apply again the Hacking Frequency 
Principle, we obtain after conditioning on 9= {P) with 
P(S) = p, P(F) = 1-p: 
p 
bcln {P l (S) = p = J mw([x, I]) dx. 
0 
The second equality results from the fact that only those 
bbd that jump before p will touch ( {p}, S) and 
bcJn{Pl (S) is equal to the integral of those bbd that touch 
( { p}, S). Derivating both terms on p implies that: 
mw([p,I]) = 1 Vpe [0,1]. 
In conc lusion we have derived the bbd on w when IQI = 
2. 
Some properties can be easily derived. 
1) Suppose the agent knows that.9'= {P: a::; P(S)::; b, 0 
�a < b � I}. We condition mw on the cylindric al 
extension of [a, b). The bbd mw(A) for Ar;;,w is 
transferred to Ancyl([a, b)). belv/'tS) is the integral of 
all the bbd that touch only S after conditioning on cyl((a, 
b]), i.e., those bbd that jump to S before a: 
a 
belW'(S) = J mw([x, 1]) dx =a 
0 
Similarly plw9tS) is the integral of all the bbd that touch 
S, i.e., that jump to S before b: 
b 
plw"(S) = f mw([x,l]) dx = b 
0 
This result should not be extrapolated blindly to higher 
dimensions (see section 4 ). 
2) The case IQI = 2 can be nicely represented by figure 2 
(Smets, 1978). Each point in the triangle corresponds to 
one interval of (0,1]. In general, if positive bbd are given 
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only to intervals, we assign the bbd given to [a,b] to the 
point (a,b) of the triangle. Then: 
bb 
bel([a,b])::::: f f m([x,y]) dy dx 
a x 
b 1 
pl([a,b]) = f f m([x,y]) dy dx 
0 avx 
a 1 
q([a,b])::::: f f m([x,y]) dy dx 
0 b 
([ b))::::: _ {)
2bel([a,b)) 
= 
_ iPq([a,b]) m a, aa db 2a ob 
The result of the application of Dempster's rule of 
combination is given by mult iplying the commonality 
functions. 
0 from 
0 
Figure 2: Parametric representation on beliefs on [0, I] 
when the focal elements are intervals . The shaded areas 
are those on which integration is performed in order t o  
compute bel([a,b] (a triangle) , q([a,b]) (a rectangle) and 
pl([a,b]) (a rectangle with right lower corner truncated). 
In the present case (1.0.1=2) the non-null bbd of mw 
obtained after conditioning on S are given to the intervals 
[a,l], hence they cluster on the upper horizontal line. 
Those obtained after conditioning on F arc g iven to the 
intervals [O,b], hence they cluster on the left vcnical linc. 
Suppose You perform n independent experiments and 
observe r successes, s failures where r + s � n (the 
difference n - (r + s) is the number of experiments for 
which the outcome is not available). The commonality 
function induced on [f' n = [0, I] 
-by a success is: q!P n([a,b] I S) = a 
-by a failure is: q!P,/[a,b] I F)::::: 1-b 
-by a 'SuF' is: q!Pn([a,b] I SuF) = 1 
The belief function induced by 'SuF' is the vacuous 
belief function that reflect the state of total ignorance in 
which You are after just learning the tautology 'SuF'. 
Hence we can just as well drop all 'vacuous' results and 
assume n = r+s. 
The commonality function induced by r successes and s 
failures in n independent (Bemoullian) trials is obtained 
by multiplying the corresponding commonality functions. 
Hence: 
In that case, by derivating q!P n ([a,b) I r, s) and 
appropriate normalization, we get: 
1 _r(r+s+l) r-1 s-1 m!P0([a ,b] r, s)- r(r) f(s) a (1-b) 
where r is the gamma function. 
When n�oo, r�np, s--tn(l-p) (hence p = lim...!..._), the r+s 
limit of m([a,b] I r, s) tends to 0 except for a dirac 
function at p. In that case bel(A I r,s) = I if pEA and 0 
otherwise. After accumulating an infinite number of 
information, You will be in a state of 'total certainty ' , of 
'knowledge' about the value of P(S). 
3) Suppose You want to compute the belief that the next 
outcome is a success (or a failure) given You have 
already observed r successes and s failures in n 
independent trials. We use m([a,bJ I r, s) as the a priori 
belief over [0, 1]. Dempster's rule of combination m12::::: 
m16;)m2 can be represented as (Dubois and Prade, 1986, 
SmeL<>, 1993a): 
m12(A) = L m1(A I B) m2(B) 
Bc;;;Q 
bei12(A) = I bell (A I B) mz(B) 
B�.Q 
where m1 (A I B) and bel1 (A I B) are unnormalized 
conditional basic belief masses and belief functions. 
Generalizing this relation in the present context and 
denoting beln(P: P(S)e (a,bll(S) by beln(S I P(S)E[a,b]) 
(which value equals a), one obtains: 
1 1 
bcln(Sir,s) = f f beln(SIP(S)E [a,b])m!P ([a,b]lr,s) db da 
0 a n 
So: 
and 
1 1 
= J f a f(!+s+l) ar-1 (1-b)s-1 db da 
0 a r(r) f(s) 
r beln(S I r, s) "'r+s+ 1 
s beln(F I r, s) = --1 r+s+ 
1 mn(SuF I r,s) =--1. T+S+ 
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This result shows that the observed proportion is an 
excellent approximation of beln if r+s is not too small. 
4. CASE WITH IQI = 3. 
Suppose 1!11 = 3 where n = {A, B, C}. 1P n can be 
represented by an equilateral triangle where each point 
corresponds to an element of 1Pn. The three heights are 
equal to the three probabilities P(A), P(B) and �(C): Th
_
e 
height of such a triangle is 1 and the length of 1L<; s1de IS 
equal to -f413. 
By requirement 1, we know that the focal elements of 
mw can be represented by: 
(.9'A, A)v(_9E, B)v�c. C) 
where (9'-'A, .9E, �) are the elements of a partition of 
!Pn. 
In order to specify the form of the subsets_9X, XE (A, B, 
C}, we consider the conditioning of mw on the sct.9'i c: 
IPn where 
I -a 1 - bo .9l = {P: P = (PA· PB· Pc): PB = bo + al PA· 
Pc=l-PA·Ps}. (4.1) 
where bo ,a1 E [0, 1], bo < 1-aJ. 
This set .9'L corresponds to the subset of 1P n where 
P(A)E [0, ai] and P(B) and P(C) are l inearly related to 
P(A). Requirement 3 states that, after conditioning mw 
on.9i, the bbd so obtained on the spacc .9-L is identical to 
those obtained when 101=2 (indeed every clement of the 
new subdomain is characterized by P(A) as when IQ1=2). 
Therefore after further conditioning on A, the focal 
elements on.9L should be of the form of intervals [a, a1l 
(see figure 3). This requirement is sufficient in order to 
derive the structure of the focal elements of mw. 
A A 
B 
Figure 3: Explanation of Requirement 3. Left figure: the 
IP n space with I.QI = 3, and the9l domain. Middle 
figure: a bbd that satisfies Requirement 3. Right figure: a 
bbd that does not satisfy Requirement 3 
Requirement 3: 
If IQJ = 3, for every fTA. there exists an aE [0, a I) such 
that the projection of .9'A on .9i is the interval [a, a1l· 
Requirement 3 can identically be defined as: 
Requirement 3': 
If IQI = 3, mw(X 1.9iJ� 0 if it exists an aE [0, a1) 
and X= {P: PE.9i, PA?: a}· 
= 0 otherwise. 
Each requirement implies that the limits between.9'A and 
.913 must be a straight line passing through the corner 
where P(C) = 1 and that crosses the opposite side of the 
triangle (and similarly for the other limits). Every focal 
clements of mw can be labeled by an element q = (qA, 
qs, qc)e IPn. The focal element labeled by q is the set 
§(q) = (.9-'A(q), A)v(,9t(q), B)v(g'{:(q), C) (4.2) 
where: 
.'i'A(q) = (P: P = (PA, PB, Pc)E IPn, 
QA QA 
PA � max(ps qs· PC qc ) 
and similarly for ,9Js(q) and �(q) where the A,B,C­
indcxes are symm etrically exchanged. The graphical 
representation of .9'A (q) is the upper corner of the 1P n 
triangle that incl udes all points in IP n between the upper 
corner and the two straight lines drawn from the two 
other corners through q. belw(X l A) for Xt.;;;IPnwill be 
the ' integral ' of all the bbd given to the focal elements 
.9\q) such that Xc:.9-'A(q). 
Figure 4 shows the structure of the partition so generated. 
The value of bcln(A 1.:1'= {(a, b, c)} ) is the ' integral ' of 
mw taken over all q in the triangle which corners are (0, 
0, 1), (0, 1, 0) and (a, b, c). Reapplying the Hacking 
Frequency Principle we have: 
A 
bcln(A 1.9-'= {(a, b, c)} ) =a (4.3) 
It can then be proved that the only function mw 
symmetric in the three arguments of q that satisfies (4.3) 
for every (a, b. c) E IP n is the function mw(.9'{q)) = {3 
for every qE IP n· 
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A 
Figure 4: Structure of the domain of mw and one 
example of bbd labeled q when IQI = 3. The shaded area 
is§-lA(q). 
Some properties derived from this solution arc detailed. 
1) Iff?-'= [(.5, 0, .5), (.5, .5, 0)}, then mn(A) = l/3, 
mn(B) = mn(C) :::: 0, m.n (AuB) :::: mn(AuC) = l/6, 
mn(BuC) = 1/3, mn(AuBuC) = 0. This result merits 
some reflection. One might be surprised that even though 
P(A) :::: .5 is exactly known, one does not have beln(A) 
= 
.5. If the frame had been A versus A, the critic would 
have been appropriate, except that in such a frame we just 
have the required results. The difference observed here 
reflects the fact that there are three clements. What is 
nice is that the pignistic probability induced in this case is 
such that BetP(A) 
= 
.5 (the pignistic transformation is 
detailed in next section). 
2) If§-1= {(.5, b, c): b+c = .5], then mn(A) = I/3, mn(B) 
= mn(C) = 0, m.n(AuB) = mn(AuC) = l/6, mn(BuC) = 
1/4, mn(AuBuC) = 1/12. The same remarks hold as for 
the case 1, but BetP(A) = .5 as it should. 
3) If .9' = {(a, b, c): a:-:;:.5, b:-5.5, c:-:;:.5}, the n mn(A) = 
mn(B) = mn(C) = 0 , mn(Au B) = mn(AuC) = 
mn(BuC) = .25, mn(AuBuC) = .25. 
4) Suppose You know that §-lis characterized by a lower 
probability function P* on .n. Let P* be the upper 
probability function dual of P*, i.e., P*(X) = 1 - P .. (X) 
for X�Q. Let a= P*{A), b = P*(B), c = P*(C), A= 
P*(A), B = P*(B), C = P*(C). The belief on Q induced by 
the set &?.'of probability distributions P on .n compatible 
with the upper and lower probabilities (i.e., VA c:::n, 
P ... (A):S:P(A):-;;?*(A)) is given by: 
A 
m(A) 
Figure 5: Domain of P.Q when 101 = 3. The hexagon 
represents the set f?-' of probability functions compatible 
with a given lower probability function. The values of 
mn(A 1.:7-) and mn(AuB 1.9} are the shaded surfaces. 
mn(AuBuC I f?-j is the surface of the hexagon plus the 
three small left over triangles fixed on its side. 
a beln(A)== -­a+B+C 
b bcln(B) == A+b+C 
c beln(C)= --A+B+c 
bcln(AuB) = (l-C)2 + C (a+b) 
bcln(AuC) = (l-Bf + B (a+c) 
bcln(BuC) == (1-A)2 + A  (b+c) 
bcln(AuBuC) == 1 
These results are obtained by computing the various 
surfaces described in figure 5. 
It is worth noticing that bel is not equal toP*, even when 
P* is a belief function. Why should they? The 
transferable belief model never requires that the belief 
function that quantities our belief should be the lower 
envelop of a set of probability function. 
5. PIGNISTIC PROBABILITY. 
In Smets (1990a, 1993 b) and Smets and Kennes (1994), 
we have shown how to build the appropriate probability 
function BclP, called the pignistic probability function, 
from a belief function when a decision must be made. We 
have shown that the only 'rational' transformation, called 
the pignistic transformation, must satisfy the following 
rule when the betting frame Q is finite. Let m be the basic 
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belief assignment quantifying the agent's beliefs over n. 
For roe.Q, 
BetP(ro) = 1 L IAI m(A) 
A: OlE ACQ 
where IAI is the number of elements of Q in A. Any other 
probability function would lead to irrationality in the 
betting behavior of the agent. Its extension to continuous 
cases is easy to realize if the bbd are really densities, in 
which case sums become classical integrals. 
We study how decision should be made when beliefs are 
induced by a set of probabilities, i.e., how to derive the 
appropriate pignistic probability from the in itia l belief 
induced by the knowledge that Pe� IP Q· The choice of 
the appropriate betting frame is important. We could 
think to build the belief function over Q that quantifies 
our belief over Q and apply the pignistic transformation 
to such a belief function over Q using Q as the betting 
frame. But this is an erroneous strategy as the betting 
frame is not Q but W. The beliefs induced by Pe .9'is a 
belief over W, the belief derived on Q is only the result of 
the marginalization of the first one on n. 
Using W as the betting frame, we apply the pignistic 
transformation to Belw. For X<: IP n let S(X) be the 
surface of X. Suppose the agent who wants to bet on Q 
knows only that PE .9: The pignistic transformation 
implies that the bbd mw(.:?-{q)) given to j'{q) (see (4.2)) 
be equally distributed among the elements of :7'. 
S(.9'A(q)n9J BetPQ(A) = f S(!?-) dq. 
qe 1Pn 
Interchanging the order of integration, one gets that 
1 BetPQ(A) = $(.9) f f 1(9-'A(q)ll{P)  dq dP 
Pe.9'"qe IP Q 
where I(X) = 1 if X:;e0, 
One has: 
hence: 
0 otherwise. 
f 1(9-'A(q)ll{P)) dq = P(A), 
qe !Pn 
1 BetPn(A) = S(.:?-) f P(A) dP. Pe§-' 
The pignistic probability BetPn(A) so derived is 
equivalent to the probability one would derive by 
assuming an equi a priori density over rPn. conditioning 
it on 9, and computing the expected probability of P(A). 
In particular, when IQI = 2 and§-'= [a, b), the result is: 
BetP(S) = I +; - b. 
These are quite natural results. BetPn(. I .9) indeed 
happens to be the center of gravity of§-'", but its dcri vat ion 
does not result from the use of an equi a priori density 
over !P n· It just happens that both approaches lead to the 
same results: 1) the equi a priori density over !Pn and 2) 
the application of the pignistic transformation combined 
with the evaluation of BetPn(X I� as Bet.Pw(cyl(X) 1.97 
for X<: Q, where BetPw is the pignistic probability 
obtained from belw(. IYj over the betting frame W. 
6. CONCLUSIONS: 
1) Generalization to 1.01 > 3 is conceptually easy, but very 
laborious when solutions must be written down. Nothing 
new comes out of it. In practice, computation will not 
been based on the explicit equations, but on some Monte 
Carlo method. 
2) Generalization of the procedure can be achieved if one 
has a non-degenerated belief function on !P Q if there are 
only a finite number of subsets of !P n that receive 
positive basic belief masses (more general cases are not 
considered here). Let (.;?-l1: i= 1, 2 ... n} be the set of focal 
elements of beliP n with their basic belief masses 
miP0�). For each focal element.q', we derive belw(. I 
PE�) over W. The belief function belw over Q induced 
{(.:1-i. miP0�)): i= l, 2 ... n)is: 
n 
'd ACW belw(A) =I belw(A I Pe.9i) miP0�) 
i=l 
3) Suppose two pieces of evidence that say that Pe§-'1 
and PE.0'2, respectively. The combination of these two 
pieces of evidence leads to the knowledge Pe.9'ln9'2· 
One could build bell on W as the belief function induced 
by the knowledge that Pe.99.. Identically, one could build 
bel2 on W as the belief function induced by the 
knowledge that Pe.9'2. One could then be tempted, 
erroneously in fact, to combine bel 1 and bel2 into 
bel1 EBbel2 by Dempster's rule of combination. 
One could also build bel12 on W as the belief function 
induced by the knowledge that PE.9'1 rl9'2. In general 
bcl12 ;<:bell (Bbel2. Only bel 12 is correct. Indeed 
Dempster's rule of combination is applicable iff both 
pieces of evidence are distinct, and distinctness is not 
satisfied in the present context because of the existence of 
a unique underlying probability function on Q that create 
a link between the two pieces of evidence. 
4) In conclusion, the knowledge that the probability 
function P over n belongs to some subset .9' of IP n 
permits the construction of a belief function bel over IP n 
x Q and over n. It must be enhanced that in general the 
belief function beln induced over Q by a lower 
probability function P"' will not satisfy beln = P* even if 
P* happens to be a belief function. By showing what is 
530 Smets 
the belief induced by a lower probability, we hope we 
have been able to show the fundamental difference 
between the upper and lower probabilities model and the 
transferable belief model (see also Smets, 1987, Smets 
and Kennes, 1994, Halpern and Fagin, 1990). 
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Abstract 
Over time, there have been refinements in the 
way that probability distributions are used for 
representing beliefs. Models which rely on single 
probability distnlnrtions depict a complete 
ordering among the propositions of interest, yet 
human beliefs are sometimes not completely 
ordered. Non-singleton sets of probability 
distributions can represent partially ordered 
beliefs. Convex sets are particularly convenient 
and expressive, but it is known that there are 
reasonable patterns of belief whose faithful 
representation require less restrictive sets. The 
present paper shows that prior ignorance about 
three or more exclusive alternatives and the 
emergence of partially ordered beliefs when 
evidence is obtained defy representation by any 
single set of distributions, but yield to a 
representation based on several sets. The partial 
order is shown to be a partial qualitative 
probability which shares some intuitively 
appealing attributes with probability distributions. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Probability distributions have long been advocated as a 
useful foundation for the modeling of beliefs. The best 
known form of probabilistic belief representation consists 
of a single distribution. Such models bring with them a 
well-developed normative theory of behavior in the face of 
risk (Savage, 1972) which has had many adherents over 
the years. 
Recently, some researchers have concluded that single 
distribution models are too restrictive. Beliefs may not 
always be completely ordered by the believer, even though 
a single probability distnbution necessarily represents them 
as being so. Nevertheless, other attributes of probability 
distributions do seem like accurate portrayals of how 
beliefs behave with respect to Boolean combinations of the 
underlying events, and of how beliefs change in the f8ce of 
evidence. Some of these desirable attributes are peculiar to 
probability distributions. So, to have the attnbutes, a belief 
representation must either use probability distributions or 
else use measures that agree with some probability 
distributions (Snow, 1992). 
One way to get the desirable attributes of probabilities 
without the undesirable restrictiveness of a compJete 
ordering is to model beliefs using non-singleton sets of 
probability distributions. It is often convenient to use 
convex sets of probability distributions, which arise as 
solutions to systems of simultaneous linear inequalities. 
Many natural language expressions of belief are easily 
translated into linear inequality constraints (Nilsson, 
1986), e.g. "This event is at least as likely as that one." 
Linear constraint systems can be revised simply by Bayes' 
formula (Snow, 1 99 1). Although there is a diversity of 
opinion about how set estimates might inform decision 
making, there are useful suggestions for decision rules in 
the literature (for a review, see Sterling and Morren, 
1991). 
As versatile as convex sets are, there are reasonable belief 
patterns that convex sets fail to represent. For example, 
the set of posterior probabilities derived from a convex set 
of priors and a convex set of conditionals is generally not 
convex (White, 1986). Further, some important 
constraints are non-linear. Kyburg and Pittarelli ( 1992) 
discuss the non-convex sets which arise from the non­
linear assumption of independence between events. 
The present paper explores a circumstance where no single 
set of probability distributions, convex or otherwise, 
faithfully represents a reasonable pattern of belief: namely, 
ignorance being overcome by evidence when there are 
more than two alternatives. By ignorance, we mean that 
the believer is unwilling to · assert any non-trivial prior 
ordering among the sentences of interest. By being 
overcome by evidence, we mean that the believer will 
assert some non-trivial orderings if the contrast between 
the conditional probabilities for the evidence given the 
senten<:es is sufficiently impressive. 
A probabilistic solution to the representation of ignorance 
being overcome by evidence is presented. Although the 
model is more complex than a single set of probability 
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distributions, the orderings that arise have much in 
common with single posterior probability distributions, 
and inference about the orderings is computationally 
inexpensive. 
2. NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
ABOUT IGNORANCE 
In this paper, we sball use the notation 
S >e> T 
to denote the condition that the believer asserts that 
sentence S is, with a warrant satisfactory to the believer, at 
least as belief�worthy as sentence T in light of evidence e. 
If evidence e does not lead the believer to assert an 
ordering of sentences S and T, then we write 
S ?e? T 
The condition of having no relevant evidence is indicated 
by the particle nil, as in 
S ?nil? T 
which expression denotes that there is no ordering 
between some sentences S and T in the absence of 
evidence. 
We shall assume that the sentences of interest belong to a 
partitioned domain, which is defined as follows; 
Definition. A partitioned domain is a set comprising: 
(i) the always-true sentence, denoted true 
(ii) the always false sentence, denoted false 
(ill) two or more mutually exclusive sentences, called 
atoms 
(iv) well-formed expressions involving atoms, or, and 
parentheses, called simple disjunctions 
(v) well-formed expressions involving simple disjunctions, 
true, false, or, not, and parentheses 
We shall assume throughout that the atoms in the domain 
are collectively exhaustive, that is, one of the atoms is 
true. This additional assumption places little 
epistemological burden on the believer (at worst, it means 
that one of the atoms is "none of the other atoms are 
true"), and has the convenient effect that every sentence in 
the domain has an equivalent simple disjunction. Finally, 
although infinite domains are useful in such applications as 
statistical hypothesis testing, we shall assume throughout 
this paper that the number of atoms in the domain is finite. 
Our first assumptions about ignorance, and the conquest 
of ignorance by evidence express the following ideas. If no 
evidence has yet been observed, and the question of 
relative belief-worthiness is not answerable on logical 
grounds, then there is no satisfactory warrant to order one 
sentence ahead of another. Even after evidence has been 
observed, the question may remain open. Once a 
commitment to an ordering is made, then other 
commitments may be inferred by conditional probability 
considerations. A belief-ordering consistency principle 
discussed by Sugeno (unpublished dissertation, cited in 
Prade, 1985) obtains regardless of the presence or absence 
of evidence. The formal assumptions are: 
AI. (Lack of explicit non-trivial prior orderings) For any 
sentences S and T, 
S >nit> T implies that T implies S.  
Al. (Lack of implicit non-trivial prior orderings) Values 
for conditional probabilities and orderings among them are 
neither known nor assumed if those values or orderings 
imply non-trivial constraints on the prior probabilities. 
AJ. (Consistency) For all evidence e, including nil, and 
any sentences S and T, 
if T implies S, then S >e> T. 
A4. (Impartiality) If S >e> T, and S' and T' are 
sentences, and S is exclusive ofT , then 
if S' is exclusive of T and p( e I S' ) >= p( e I S ), 
then S' >e> T, and 
if S is exclusive of T' and p( e I T ) >= p( e I T' ), 
then S >e> T'. 
AS. (Recovery from ignorance about atoms) For exclusive 
atoms s and t, and non-nil evidence e, a neceswy 
condition for s >e> t is that p( e I s ) >= p( e I t ), and if 
p( e t s ) > 0, then the inequality is strict. If p( e I s ) > 0, 
then p( e I t ) = 0 is not a necessary condition for s >e> t. 
A6. (Dominance) For any sentences S, T, U and U where 
(S and U) and (T and U) are both false and U implies U, 
and for all evidence e, including nil, 
if( S or U )  >e> ( T or U ), then S >e> T, and 
if ( S >e> T ), then ( S or U ) >e> ( T or U' ). 
3. COMMENTARY ON THE 
ASSUMPTIONS 
Assumption Al explains one circumstance where we 
decline to assert any ordering: when there is no evidence, 
and the one sentence doesn't imply the other. A2 restricts 
the scope of the assumptions to problems whose givens 
rule out no prior probability distribution over the atoms. 
The conditions in assumption A2 reflect the easily-shown 
fact that a disjunctive conditional like p( e I S ) is a convex 
combination of the conditionals for the atoms in S, with 
weights proportional to the prior probabilities of the 
atoms. 
Assumption A3 says that we always assert an ordering 
